Fortune Favors the Prepared? τύχη in The History of the Peloponnesian War by O\u27Toole, Liam
Parnassus: Classical Journal 
Volume 7 Article 13 
2020 
Fortune Favors the Prepared? τύχη in The History of the 
Peloponnesian War 
Liam O'Toole 
College of the Holy Cross, lzotoo20@g.holycross.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://crossworks.holycross.edu/parnassus-j 
 Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons 
Recommended Citation 
O'Toole, Liam (2020) "Fortune Favors the Prepared? τύχη in The History of the Peloponnesian War," 
Parnassus: Classical Journal: Vol. 7 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://crossworks.holycross.edu/parnassus-j/vol7/iss1/13 
This Essays is brought to you for free and open access by CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Parnassus: Classical Journal by an authorized editor of CrossWorks. 
95 
 
Fortune Favors the Prepared? τύχη in The History of the 
Peloponnesian War 
 
Liam O’Toole ’20 
 Given how frequently Thucydides references τύχη 
(tuchè) in his History of the Peloponnesian War, it is clear that 
the concept, however he may define it, is essential for 
comprehending his narration of the war between Sparta and 
Athens. What, then, does Thucydides mean by τύχη? Are the 
most common translations of “luck,” “chance,” or “fortune” 
sufficient? Not so. After exploring different passages in which 
it plays a vital role, it is evident that Thucydides understands 
τύχη in a complex fashion. In this paper, I will examine a 
small subset of the passages in which τύχη appears in order to 
try to strike at the heart of Thucydides’ intent when employing 
this loaded word. Critically, τύχη does not often appear in 
isolation. In fact, Thucydides, in part, formulates his 
understanding of τύχη in relation to two other abstract ideas: 
παρα λογον (“contrary to expectation”) and γνωμη 
(“knowledge,” “opinion”). Through exploring the relationship 
between τύχη and these other ideas, it becomes easier to see 
how Thucydides thinks. This paper will explore Thucydides’ 
multilayered understanding of τύχη and its role in the outcome 
of the Peloponnesian War and human events more generally. 
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 Thucydides was neither the first Greek historian, nor 
the first Greek author, to employ τύχη as an explanatory tool. 
In their works, most ancient Greek authors often brought τύχη 
into the equation when they were unable to explain an event 
as the result of human action. Others, like Hesiod, saw Τύχη 
as a divine force, a literal goddess born from Thetis and 
Okeanos1. Thucydides largely followed the former tradition. 
This becomes clear through the words of the Athenian orator 
Pericles in his first speech in The History of the Peloponnesian 
War. Therein, he speaks to the Athenian (and Thucydidean) 
notion of τύχη as an explanation for the inexplicable. He states 
that, “‘The movement of events is often as wayward and 
incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is 
why we ascribe to chance whatever is contrary to 
expectation'” (‘ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων 
οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, 
εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι’ 1.140.1).  Here is the first instance that 
Thucydides connects τύχη to events that are παρα λογον, or 
“contrary to expectation.” In this use, τύχη becomes the 
“ready-made scapegoat for the inexplicable events of 
history.”2 This is not the only time that Thucydides proves to 
use τύχη in this way. Section 2.85.2, for instance, describes 
 
1  Hesiod, Theogony, 336-370; Sorensen (2014), 26  
2  Sorensen (2014), 26 
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the aftermath of the naval battle of Naupactus where the 
Spartans suffer a loss Thucydides terms “ὁ παράλογος.”3 The 
reason this loss was unexpected was because the Spartans had 
the superior number of ships going into the fight. Stunned, the 
Spartan generals attempt to boost their soldiers’ confidence 
before the next battle by claiming that this disastrous result 
came about because “‘fortune was in many ways unpropitious 
to us’” (‘ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα 
ἐναντιωθῆναι’ 2.87.2).  By blaming τύχη, the Spartan 
generals make the same “scape goat” association between 
τύχη and παρα λογον as Pericles.  
 By far the greatest example of Thucydides’ impulse 
to connect events that happen παρα λογον to τύχη comes in 
the Pylos episode in Book 4. At one point during the fighting, 
the Athenians find themselves warding off the Spartans, who 
are attacking by sea, from Laconian land. Thucydides draws 
attention to this occurrence primarily because the Spartans 
“particularly prided themselves on being a land power 
supreme in infantry” while the Athenians were “seafarers who 
excelled in fighting with ships” (ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης 
ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ 
κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον 
προύχειν 4.12.3). Although not explicitly defined as παρα 
λογον, this situation was clearly unexpected and contrary to 
 
3 Thucydides 2.85.2 
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expectation. What brought about this unusual situation? 
Thucydides claims that it was τύχη alone: “Fortune brought it 
round into this state” (ἐς τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη 4.12.3). 
This is not the only time that τύχη comes into play 
during the Pylos episode. Indeed, τύχη is a factor from the 
moment a storm “happens” to force the Athenian troops to 
land at Pylos in the first place.4 τύχη later benefits the 
Athenians when they trap the Spartans on the nearby island of 
Sphakteria, for an accidental fire clears the forest and allows 
the Athenian general Demosthenes to make a bold attack.5 
Demosthenes and the Athenians then surround the Spartans 
and force them to surrender. Such an outcome was entirely 
unexpected, leading Thucydides to describe the Pylos episode 
as “the biggest event contrary to expectation of the Greeks 
during the war” (παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν 
πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο 4.40.1). While he uses 
παρὰ γνώμην (“contrary to opinion”) in place of παρα λογον 
(“contrary to expectation”), the sense is the same. Considering 
their unexpected conclusion, it is unsurprising that 
Thucydides works so hard to demonstrate the critical role that 
τύχη played the Pylos episode. 
 
4  “While they were objecting, it happened that a storm came up and 
forced them into Pylos (ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν ἐπιγενόμενος 
κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν Πύλον 4.3.1) 
5  “One of them accidently set fire to a small part of the woods, and after 
this a wind came up, most of the woods burned down before they knew it” 
(ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου 
πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε κατακαυθέν 4.30.2) 
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That he uses it to explain events that he cannot 
otherwise explain does not begin to encompass the entirety of 
Thucydides’ conception of τύχη. Despite its seemingly 
inextricable link to the inexplicable, Thucydides’ idea of τύχη 
still lies within the realm of human control—to a degree, that 
is. Specifically, Thucydides contrasts the idea of τύχη with 
words denoting preparation/skill (γνωμη, παρασκυη, τεχνη) in 
several episodes of his work in order to demonstrate that τύχη 
is a force that can be controlled, but only with the proper tools. 
Pericles gives credence to this idea when he tells his soldiers, 
“‘Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be 
cultivated by the way or at chance times’” (‘τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν 
τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, 
ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι’ 1.142.9).  Pericles here directly 
contrasts τύχῃ (“chance”) with τέχνη (“skill”). That is, success 
cannot and will not come by simply trusting in τύχῃ. Later in 
his speech, Pericles goes further, reminding the Athenians 
how their ancestors came to power: “‘Not by good fortune but 
by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they drove the 
Barbarian away and raised us to our present height of 
greatness’” (‘γνώμῃ τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ καὶ τόλμῃ μείζονι ἢ 
δυνάμει τόν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεώσαντο καὶ ἐς τάδε προήγαγον 
αὐτά’ 1.144.4).  Although τέχνη has become γνώμη 
(“wisdom”), the idea that skill and preparation are to be 
trusted more than τύχη remains the same.  
100 
 
 Through the previously discussed naval battle of 
Naupactus, Thucydides provides further indication that skill 
can override τύχη. While the Spartan generals attribute their 
loss here mainly to τύχη, they also note that “they lacked 
preparation” for any type of sea battle (τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευῇ 
ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο 2.87.2). This battle, then, is a perfect 
illustration of what Pericles earlier stated: there will be no 
opportunity for good fortune without proper preparation and 
skill. Thucydides pointedly makes no mention of τύχη in his 
narration of the battle. Rather, he makes sure to note how the 
Athenian general Phormio makes a careful plan to wait for 
wind to break up the Spartan naval formation.6 In crafting a 
plan rather than relying on chance, Phormio makes use of all 
three ideas contrary to τύχη by trusting in his knowledge and 
his navy’s preparation and skill. Phormio does not wait for 
τύχη to come his way, but rather makes his own “luck.” This 
maneuver embodies what Thucydides has been striving to 
portray by contrasting τύχη with these different ideas. He 
shows that while τύχη itself might be out of human control, 
the outcome of events its effects are not. Phormio and Pericles 
both show that while τύχη is not “a force...that we can 
control,” it nonetheless “can be countered with preparation 
and experience.”7  
 
6 Thucydides 2.84.2-3 
7 Heilke (2004), 134 
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 Why must τύχη be countered in the first place? In 
Thucydides’ interpretation, τύχη is not always a benevolent 
good. In fact, it is most often a dangerous psychological 
construct. When something unexpected happens, both those 
whom it benefits and those whom it harms perceive it as the 
result of τύχη. Soon after, the idea of τύχη invades the minds 
of both the victor and the vanquished. Each side begins to buy 
into the idea that what happened was out of their control; the 
losers genuinely believe they can never win again while the 
winners perceive themselves to be invincible. The Athenian 
general Diodotus, in his speech advocating against sacking the 
Mytilenians, first articulates such a psychological conception 
of τύχη. He claims that trusting in ἐλπὶς (“hope”) gives the 
impression that τύχη is on your side.8 This is only a problem, 
however, because τύχη, “induces states as well as individuals 
to run into peril, however inadequate their means” (ἀδοκήτως 
γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων 
κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, 3.45.6). Through Diodotus, 
Thucydides begins to demonstrate his understanding of τύχη 
as not simply an imaginary force, but rather as a dangerous 
mindset. Because “perceptions or descriptions of events as 
lucky or unlucky motivate deeds in turn,” Thucydides’ 
 
8  “Desire and hope are in all things, the former leading, the latter urging it 
on, the former devising the plan, the latter suggesting fortune will be kind” 
(ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ 




believes that it is one’s belief in τύχη that causes events, not 
τύχη itself.9 
 The Spartan reaction to the Pylos episode leads to a 
further clarification on the psychological effects of τύχη. 
After losing the battle, the Spartans send ambassadors to the 
Athenians in hopes of reaching a peace settlement. In their 
talks, the Spartans bring up the ever-changing nature of τύχη. 
Using themselves as a prime example, they warn the 
Athenians that “‘You should not suppose that, because your 
city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will 
always have fortune on your side’” (‘οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν 
παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων 
καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔσεσθαι’ 4.18.3). τύχη 
is not a one-and-done experience to the Spartans or 
Thucydides. It must be constantly acquired and directed, 
earned through human γνώμη. To become complacent and to 
trust that one instance of τύχη will lead to others can cause a 
drop-off in the preparation and forethought necessary to 
control τύχη in the first place. More dangerously, it can lead 
to a corresponding increase in confidence, often to the point 
of arrogance that the Spartans warn against here.  
 Of course, the Athenians do not listen to their enemies 
instead letting τύχη get into their heads. At the close of the 
Pylos episode, Thucydides notes that even as the Spartans 
 
9  Schillinger, 16 
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continued to send ambassadors to release those captured on 
Sphakteria, “the Athenians only raised their terms” (οἱ δὲ 
μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο 4.41.4). Clearly, they were already 
beginning to trust in their present τύχῃ. This arrogance comes 
back to bite the Athenians a few chapters later, when the 
Sicilians make peace so the Athenians will not attack. 
Thucydides writes that the Athenians did not expect things to 
go this way. Indeed, they had fully expected to conquer Sicily, 
“for in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea 
of a reverse; they expected to accomplish everything, possible 
or impossible, with any force, great or small” (οὕτω τῇ [τε] 
παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε 
ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι 4.65.4). It 
is clear that the Athenian perception of their own capabilities 
had already become inflated. This inflated ego comes to a 
head in the disastrous defeat that results from the Sicilian 
expedition. As one scholar notes, “Athens' actions from Pylos 
through to Sicily” illustrates “the pattern of good fortune 
leading to υβρις and resulting in downfall.” 
 Naturally, there are two sides to the psychological 
construct of fortune—both equally dangerous. In the 
aftermath of Pylos, the Spartans experience the psychological 
effect of τύχη opposite to their opponents: they “wallow in 
fear of bad luck.” In its disheartening effect, τύχη is just as 
104 
 
malignant as in its confidence-boosting impact. At Cythera, 
soon after their defeat at Pylos, Thucydides writes that “ 
Never in their [Spartan] history had they shown so much 
hesitation in their military movements” ( ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, 
εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο 4.55.2 ).What 
caused such a change in the Spartan mindset? τύχη, of course: 
“Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken 
by the many startling reverses which had befallen them within 
so short a time” (καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ 
ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην 
παρεῖχε”4.55.13). τύχη puts the Spartans in a negative 
headspace that they are not able to overcome until their 
victory at the Battle of Mantinea. Thucydides states that by 
winning that battle, the Spartans cleared themselves of their 
previous mindset and now found themselves finally to be out 
of the grasp of fortune: “they, although reproached because of 
fortune, seemed to be the same as before in character (τύχῃ 
μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες 
5.75.3). For Thucydides, τύχη, “can cause extreme moods of 
despair and dissent or elation and over-confidence depending 
on circumstance.” To remedy the vitriolic nature of τύχη, of 
course, Thucydides would recommend γνωμη.  
 In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
aimed to present the most clear and accurate depiction of the 
events of the various campaigns, a pursuit which undoubtedly 
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made its many unexpected and inexplicable events frustrating. 
Fortunately, he had the “catch-all” word τύχη at his disposal. 
Throughout his own narration and the speeches of his 
characters (whose words are, in large part, his own), 
Thucydides uses τύχη in a much more nuanced way than 
Greek authors and historians before him. τύχη is neither a 
scapegoat nor some divine being by whose will human actions 
are determined. Rather, Thucydides’ τύχη is a powerful force, 
a psychological construct even, that can still be countered—
primarily with γνωμη. In The History of the Peloponnesian 
War, even when τύχη is present, Thucydides consistently 
attempts to show how “human actions and natural causes [are] 
the underlying explanations of the outcome.” Ultimately, this 
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